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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY ANN LUCERO 
DIPOMA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIAN McPHIE and DOES I 
through 20, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE UNKNOWN, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The following is written in reply to the Brief of Appellee filed October 
21,1999. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Dipoma would dispute the statement made by Appellee in 
the "Statement of the Case" that "the Clerk of the Court notified Dipoma of 
the same [that her check had been returned] shortly thereafter." (Appellee's 
Brief, p. 2). It should be noted there is no citation to the record for this 
assumption which is utilized by Appellee to argue that Dipoma did not act 
promptly upon notification of the check problem. The Statement of 
Appellate No. 990526-CA 
Category No. 15 
Undisputed Facts filed by the Appellee (R. 16-17) and the Appellant (R. 29-
30) did not indicate when Dipoma was notified of the returned check. 
Likewise, the Docketing Statement also does not indicate any date of 
notification to Dipoma. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT DIPOMA'S CAUSE OF 
ACTION WAS NOT COMMENCED ON 
NOVEMBER 27,1997. 
Appellant Dipoma relies upon her opening Brief to support her 
contention that the lower court erred in holding as a matter of law that she 
had failed to meet the statute of limitation requirement because her initial 
filing fee check subsequently was dishonored. Appellant will, however, 
briefly address several arguments and citations raised by the appellee in his 
responsive brief. 
It is apparent that there is a split of authority between state jurisdictions 
and federal circuits in the interpretation of problems involving filing fees and 
commencement of actions. Since this exact issue has not been decided in 
Utah, cases cited by both parties are helpful but do not control the 
interpretation of Utah law. It should also be noted that this case does not 
involve an instance where a litigant has attempted to file a complaint with a 
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clerk but has been refused because the litigant would not tender a proper 
filing fee. Here, the case was commenced with a District Court number, a 
judge was assigned, and the judicial process continued in all respects 
identical to any other case filed in the District Court. Thus, the question of 
"filing" and the question of "payment" are similar but nevertheless distinct. 
Appellee relies upon Title 21 of the Utah Code Annotated relating to 
the obligation of clerks to accept fees prior to filing documents. While this 
title clearly governs the duties of public servants it does not affect a court's 
determination of jurisdiction for purposes of a statute of limitation defense. 
In essence, if a potential litigant does not have the correct fees at the time of 
attempting to file a complaint the District Court Clerk may by statute refuse 
to process the paperwork until such fee is paid. This governmental fee statute 
is not jurisdictional for purposes of commencing a civil action. 
In Foley v. Foley, 147 Cal. App.2d 76 (Cal. App. 1956) an argument 
similar to Appellee's was made. A California statute required clerks to 
collect fees in advance. A litigant failed to pay a filing fee timely but the 
clerk still accepted the papers and filed them. The fees were not paid until 
after the statutory period had expired for filing of the original papers. 
The California Appellate Court found the filing date effective even 
though the fee was not paid within the statutory period. The Court 
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emphasized there was no indication that the legislature intended the filing be 
rendered void if the filing fee was not timely paid. The Court said: 
If it had been the legislative intent that the effectiveness of certain 
official acts would depend on the payment of fees by the persons interested in 
them, a provision directed to those interested persons and in our case 
contained in the Code of Civil Procedure would have been expected. Id. at 
78. 
The appellee acknowledges that Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure 
controls the determination of when an action commences. (Appellant's Brief, 
at 6, 7). This rule does not discuss the payment of fees in any way. It is 
therefore necessary for the appellee to utilize the governmental internal 
statutes contained in Title 21 to argue that the term "filing" does not occur 
"until the mandatory filing fees have been paid." (Appellee's Brief at 7). Just 
as the Foley court observed, if payment of a filing fee is in fact jurisdictional, 
it would have been included in the language of Rule 3 and A—it was not. 
Another provision of Utah law also supports Dipoma's position. Rule 
3 provides that an action can be commenced "by service of a summons 
together with a copy of the complaint in accordance with Rule 4." Rule 
4(c)(2) states, "If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons 
shall state that the defendant need not answer if the complaint is not filed 
within ten days after service " Thus, under Utah Rules the time for 
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measuring a statute of limitation defense can occur upon the service of a 
summons when no complaint or fee has been filed with the Clerk. 
Obviously, both Rules 3 and 4 are written with exact detail which must 
be followed if an action is to be correctly commenced. Failure to do so will 
result in lack of jurisdiction. Lock v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1955); 
Martin v.Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 
(Utah 1986); Dennett v. Powers, 536 P.2d 135 (Utah 1975); and Fibreboard 
Paper Products v. Ditrich, 475 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1970). Certainly, the 
jurisdictional requirement of a filing fee could easily have been included in 
Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellee notes that Rule 14(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure specifically requires, "the party obtaining the review shall pay to 
the Clerk of the Appellate Court such filing fees as are established by law and 
also the fee for docketing the appeal." (Appellee's Brief at 12-13). This 
Court in Hausknect v. Industrial Comm'n, 882 P.2d 683 (Utah App. 1994) 
declined to read into the rule "language limiting the jurisdictional effect of 
failure to comply." Here, any jurisdictional requirement of a filing fee is also 
notably absent from Rule 3 and Rule 4. 
It is unnecessary to elaborate in this particular case whether a litigant 
could demand a court clerk to file a complaint without a fee and without 
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signing an affidavit of impecuniosity in order to satisfy the statute of 
limitation requirement. Here, a filing fee was in fact paid and accepted by the 
Court Clerk in the form of a check and the complaint was filed, stamped, and 
assigned a case number. This undisputed factual scenario, therefore, is 
completely different from the cases relied upon by Appellee (In De-Gas, 
Boostrom, and Wanamaker, Appellee's Brief at 8-11) where the clerk refused 
to accept the complaint until a filing fee had been tendered. In all of those 
cases the actual filing of the complaint was not accomplished until after the 
statute of limitations had run. 
Even assuming arguendo as the appellee contends that the payment of 
a filing fee is a necessary prerequisite to determine when a statute of 
limitation time is calculated, the question remains in this case what effect 
does payment by check have upon this requirement. Using Appellee's logic, 
for example, would delay the actual filing date of any complaint by several 
days since even checks that clear with no problem do not fund the state 
account on the date of the filing. In some instances, a check may require a 
week before funds are actually poured into the District Court' account. 
Should the filing date, therefore, be adjusted to the actual day that funds are 
received into the Clerk's account? 
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Clearly, such a delayed calculation would be absurd and not based 
upon any rule or statute. This same principle is equally applicable to 
dishonored checks. In other words, for purposes of Appellee's argument it is 
immaterial whether a good check requires three days to clear or whether a 
bad check requires seven days to make good the funds. In both cases neither 
date is the date that the complaint is filed and date stamped. 
As noted in Appellant's opening Brief if the legislature and the 
supervisory courts of this state wish to require that payment of actual funds 
be made concurrently with the filing of a complaint then the various rules and 
statutes should require cash be paid. The use of certified funds, checks, or 
credit cards all require a time delay in the actual receipt of funds into the 
Clerk's account. 
The appellee has apparently been unable to find any other case 
involving a returned check except for the Brokerhouse International case from 
the Colorado Court of Appeals. (Appellee's Brief at 7-8). Appellant would 
submit that a review of this half-page decision relating to this issue does not 
clarify the question of "payment" at all but is merely a legal conclusion 
without any analysis. In essence, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined 
that the payment of a docketing fee only occurs when cash is received by the 
Clerk. 
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Appellee has not addressed the argument that the conditional filing fee 
by check or credit card is no different than the conditional granting of 
impecunious status until a determination by a court. (Appellant's Brief at 19-
20). When a date of filing is critical, equal protection does not allow the 
treatment of a claimed impecunious litigant to be any different than that of a 
paying litigant. There is no Utah statute or rule which requires a date of filing 
of a complaint to change if the affidavit of impecuniosity of a litigant is later 
denied. Instead, the litigant must pay the fee upon such denial with no effect 
upon the filing date. The fact that a check is dishonored and must also be 
subsequently paid should also have no effect upon the original filing date. 
Finally, the appellee argues that as a matter of law Dipoma failed to 
pay the filing fees within a reasonable time even assuming that she timely 
filed her complaint. (Appellee's Brief at 14-18). If the question of 
"reasonableness" of her action is to be addressed it should be in the district 
court where evidence may be taken. The appellate cases cited by the 
appellee all involve an initial determination by a lower court as to the 
reasonableness of the litigant's actions. This same procedure should be 
followed here. The question as to what notices Dipoma received, what she 
was told to do by the Clerk's office, and the entire time sequence should be 
evaluated by a trier of fact before any legal conclusion of law can be reached. 
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Clearly, any issue of reasonable time is one of fact which should be 
remanded if such issue is deemed relevant by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the preceding reasons, appellant Dipoma respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the order of dismissal entered in this case. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 1999. 
is S. Cook 0 Craig .  
Attorney for Appellant 
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